



CONCORDIS PAPERS III

Enabling the Sustainable and Safe Return and Reintegration of the Displaced in Darfur

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Introduction

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Since we started our Sudan peace-building programme in 1999, a host of consultations have been held on a wide range of themes, each with its own unique set of presentations, discussions, conclusions and recommendations. In keeping with Concordis International's overriding objective to build sustainable and just peace in areas suffering from war, these meetings have sought to address the root causes of Sudan's conflicts. They have built upon the peace-building work conducted by Concordis and its predecessors over the past eight years, which has focused on the facilitation of low-profile, inclusive and research-based dialogue in support of formal peace processes.

Participants have attended the consultations in a personal capacity and have included a wide range of key individuals linked with opposition groups and the government, civil society and women's groups, as well as academics and international consultants. The views expressed therefore represent a broad consensus of Sudanese viewpoints and are not necessarily the opinions of Concordis International.

This paper is the third in a series which seeks to build on the strengths of the Concordis approach through spreading the benefits of the multilateral consensus we have developed via our consultations. We proactively shared the conclusions of the three consultations on Darfur (summarised in Concordis Papers I, II and III) with negotiators, mediators and other interested parties at the AU-led talks in Abuja. Our aim here is both to summarise the presentations made and to draw together participants' discussions and recommendations into a succinct and readable form.

The Concordis Papers are available to be downloaded from our website and will be disseminated to Sudanese and international policy makers, practitioners and centres of learning. I hope you will find them to be a useful resource.



Executive Summary and Recommendations

The consultation on which this Concordis Paper is based took place in August 2005 and comprised the third in a series of meetings focussing on the conflict in Darfur. As well as seeking a better understanding of the root causes of this devastating conflict, these consultations sought to devise innovative solutions to some of its more intractable features. In this case, the purpose of the consultation was to build consensus on how to create an environment conducive to the safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes in Darfur. Given the elusive nature of peace in Darfur, the content remains relevant today.

Sudanese participants and international experts discussed the constraints and practicalities of the return and reintegration of the displaced in Darfur, resulting in the formulation of mutually agreed conclusions, recommendations and practical proposals (see pages 4 to 7). Central themes included:

- The positive aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and consideration about how these might be applied to promote peace in Darfur;
- The need for trust to be re-established between key stakeholders, and suggestions about how to promote the restoration of mutual confidence;
- The disintegrating security situation in the region, and considerations about how to improve to allow for effective repatriation of IDPs and refugees;
- The establishment of sustainable livelihoods for returning IDPs, so that they can live their lives without dependency on external agencies;
- The degradation of Darfur's environmental resources, and suggestions about how to stem this tide and promote environmental sustainability;
- The destruction of Darfur's basic infrastructure, and possible routes forward for its post-conflict reconstruction;
- The need for security sector reform (SSR) in the Darfur region and across Sudan, particularly regarding Sudan's police forces.

During the consultation, delegates were also given the opportunity to pay their respects to the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) following the untimely death of First Vice President HE Dr John Garang de Mabior. The loss of this key statesman strengthened the resolve of participants to work towards a peaceful future for the whole of the Sudan. Participants were united in their recognition that a lasting resolution of the Darfur conflict is an essential component of national peace.

Proposals for Possible Solutions

Application of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to Darfur

The principles developed during the Naivasha negotiations, culminating in the CPA of 9 January 2005, contribute to a lasting resolution of the problems of Darfur, which have political, economic and social roots. However, Darfur is unique and therefore needs its own agreement, which can draw on elements of the CPA. Recognising the need for inclusiveness, we recommend that more effort be made to ensure that a Darfur peace agreement - which we hope will soon be agreed - includes the aspirations of all of the people of Darfur, not just those who have taken up arms, so that it will enjoy broad endorsement in Darfur and across all of Sudan. The principles of decentralisation and the recognition of diversity established by the Machakos Protocol are the key to the federalism which will help the Sudan, including Darfur and the East, develop peace, democracy, justice and equality. These concepts are included in the Declaration of Principles (DoP). However, inclusiveness must also be emphasised and we recommend that the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement continue to develop common principles for negotiation, based on the genuine needs of all people of Darfur.

Establishing Sustainable Peace on the Ground

The establishment of a ceasefire with international monitors was a necessary first step, and international efforts to improve the effectiveness of the African Union (AU) force in Darfur should continue. However, for a ceasefire to last there must be more than monitoring and reporting of violations. Lack of trust is the main barrier to sustaining a ceasefire and trust can not be created overnight. However, trust can be developed gradually if there is political will to seek long-term peace and if the needs and rights of all stakeholders are taken into account. To overcome existing suspicion and move in stages to a position of increased trust, we recommend that confidence- and security-building measures appropriate to the very complex Darfur situation be included in the agreement, including mechanisms to address concerns and outbreaks of violence. These measures should be designed to encourage greater mutual transparency and increased predictability, to minimise the chance of accidental escalation and to reduce the perception of threat.

Possible measures, which need to be adapted to the Darfur situation, include inspections, air observation, communication links between commanders, demilitarised zones and putting arms out of use in a way that does not increase vulnerability. Unlike the application of such measures in the case of potential international conflict, confidence- and security-building measures in the Darfur environment require verification assistance and guarantees by third parties

such as the AU and the UN. For this reason, we recommend that the effectiveness of the AU force be improved.

Cultural and political confidence-building measures are especially important in the context of Darfur. These include: full national political participation; a code of conduct for the security sector that is properly applied and disseminated; fair and transparent application of justice and compensation for material and human loss; participation in local government by an empowered native administration; and involvement of members of all communities in this process, not just those who bear arms.

Restoring Confidence in a Return to Home Areas

Enforced return of the displaced to their home areas is wrong. The primary barrier to voluntary return is the perception of insecurity, caused primarily by lack of trust in police and security forces. We therefore recommend (a) that the AU fulfil its role to protect civilians in the short term, (b) that the AU be given a clear mandate to assist the process of return, and (c) that the police and other security forces be reformed to include members of the local communities. In addition, resources available (including compensation) and access to services in the home areas - water, fuel, building materials, livestock - need to be at least as good as those in the camps if the people are to have an incentive to return. In each village or home area, the obstacles to return of the displaced must be dealt with co-operatively, transparently and in detail. For example, questions of land ownership or use need to be dealt with fairly and firmly.

Better planning and co-ordination of international support to meet this need would make return more attractive for the displaced. However, international NGOs would need to be convinced that the necessary security guarantees, trusted by the displaced themselves, were in place. For this to be achieved, we recommend that both the government and the armed movements exercise maximum restraint, admit mistakes where appropriate and be held accountable for their actions. Moreover, the *janjaweed* and other militias must be brought under control.

Restoring Social Aspects of Security

The diversity of Darfur, like that of the Sudan as a whole, should be considered a strength and not a weakness. The interdependence between pastoralists and sedentary farmers, for example, has in the past been successfully managed by the communities themselves, with conflicts over water and land being settled by traditional means. These mechanisms have been disrupted by the politicization of the conflict, but family, tribal and religious relationships in Darfur remain strong. Social networks that have been destroyed in the villages have

been partially re-formed in the camps. There is therefore significant social capital to draw on in Darfur.

We recommend that the Government of Sudan and the international community support and develop small-scale community-based initiatives for rebuilding infrastructure. In addition, providing support for displaced people who have sought shelter with family and friends in villages, and not just for those in camps, will reduce dependence on camp facilities. In support of an Abuja agreement, we recommend a conference of all Darfurian communities to establish agreement on rebuilding the region and independent Sudanese research on the needs of Darfur. This would emphasise the importance of the Sudanese-led rehabilitation of Darfur.

Restoring Environmental Security

We considered in much detail the link between the environment and conflict in Darfur and their effect on each other. We identified particular vulnerabilities with respect to water, grazing, agriculture, timber and the soil. We recognised that environmental vulnerability had contributed to the conflict. In turn, the conflict itself, the international relief effort, the large numbers of refugees and IDPs, and even the subsequent peace have made (or may in future make) many environmental vulnerabilities worse. One of the simplest examples is the adverse effect on the environment of concentrating and supporting the displaced in camps. We recommend that an objective survey is undertaken to track these vulnerabilities and to determine which of the many possible interventions would reduce the adverse effect on the environment. Creative investment in interventions to maintain a sustainable environment will itself contribute to sustainable peace.

The Reconstruction of Darfur

Some national and international NGOs are doing valuable work in Darfur in difficult circumstances to help the people apply appropriate local technology to solve reconstruction problems in areas such as transport, infrastructure, water provision, rainwater retention, terraced agriculture, efficient fuel use and housing. Others are helping with healthcare and by loaning donkeys, goats and other livestock. Much of this work is hampered by the lack of security in some areas, but it has great potential, especially where it takes account of the wisdom of the local people on the applicability of specific technologies to their locality. We recognised the major importance of women in reconstructing communities and of community education and training to multiply the effectiveness of small-scale integrated technology. The relief and development needs of rural communities must also be considered both to support those who have not been displaced and to provide an incentive for the return of the

displaced. We recommend that barriers to the operations of national and international development NGOs - e.g. restrictions on import of animals - and financial and infrastructure barriers to trade be kept to the minimum necessary. It is also important to recognise that different communities have different needs, and the distinctive needs of nomads must be recognised. As the competition between nomads and settled farmers is one of the root causes of the conflict, creative alternatives for nomads' herds must be sought, e.g. marking of agreed migration routes (already in hand), allocation of different home areas or even compensated culling of herds.

The prerequisite for all of this work is security, and the police hold primary responsibility for providing it. We recommend that the process of improving the capability of the police and reforming their attitudes, composition and way of operating be continued, with increased emphasis on their development of trust in the community. This will require inclusive recruitment, training in human rights, a sharper focus on community relations and allocation of sufficient resources to all levels of the police force. Where the police have to operate in specific situations, e.g. in IDP camps, they should receive specific training on the sensitivities involved. In addition, citizens should be made more aware of their rights with respect to the police.

Inter-Agency Co-operation

The re-establishment of long-term peace in Darfur will require co-ordinated action by the Government of Sudan, all communities of Darfur, traditional authorities, local government, national and international NGOs, other governments and international organisations. At present, this co-ordination is hampered by mistrust and ill-defined roles. We recommend a focus on a comprehensive approach to peace, justice, security and development. In particular, we recommend the empowerment of a native administration to reinforce the rule of law and government structures.

Conclusion

The conclusions of this consultation, when combined with those of the two previous Concordis Darfur consultations, represent a consensus by a broad range of people of Darfur on the causes of the conflict and how to correct them. If the negotiators in the coming round of Abuja talks take account of these recommendations, alongside the DoP already agreed, then a peace agreement to be agreed by them is likely to enjoy broad support in Darfur. We therefore ask Viscount Brentford, the Chairman of Concordis, to convey the recommendations of all three consultations to the negotiating parties at Abuja. In addition, we undertake, in our various individual positions of influence, to work towards the urgent implementation of these recommendations.

Application of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to Darfur *Remarks by HE Hasan Abdin (Sudanese Ambassador to the UK)*

Even before the recent signing in Abuja of the Declaration of Principles (DoP), the Darfur problem had been and remained a political issue, and therefore one that had to be resolved by inclusive dialogue. Although the formal negotiations have by no means finished, we must look beyond Abuja and take on board articles 11 and 14 of the DoP, which state that any agreement has to be endorsed by the people of Darfur. All sides have moved beyond blaming and shaming, beyond demonisation and condemnation, and have progressed towards using more conciliatory language. No one can justify what has happened in Darfur, but it is generally accepted that all sides have to move forward.

The magnitude and impact of the problems in Darfur have created unwanted racial problems. Yet the fact remains that all Sudanese are bound by common values, mutual respect and Sudanese history. The Abuja process, including the signing of the DoP, has come about because of confidence-building measures and the fostering of mutual trust. The Abuja process is linked to the peace processes in Naivasha and Cairo and, through drawing on each other, should help Sudan to develop in peace, democracy, justice and equality. The Naivasha agreement should be seen as an agreement for the whole of Sudan, including the East and Darfur. The principles of power and wealth sharing, as put forward in the agreement, are the key to federalism in Sudan. The DoP expresses the will and spirit for reconciliation and for peace building, as well as providing a realistic road map for signing a final and sustainable peace that will supplement and complement the CPA..

Discussion

Sudan needs to reconcile its ethnic and religious diversity and its consequent multiple visions for the future. Ethnicity is now a major issue in Darfur, but this is a political rather than an historical problem; both the rebel groups and the Government of Sudan have an interest in stressing tribal links. A single vision or identity led by a centralised government is an impractical solution for Sudan; the idea of 'one country one nation' should be challenged, but not in a way that threatens the social fabric or territorial integrity of Sudan.

Federalism provides most of the solutions, including addressing the issue of diversity, which should be seen as a strength, not a weakness. The expansion from nine to twenty-six states was supposed to address this issue of diversity as well as increasing the states' voices and making them more community-based (following the standard European principle of subsidiarity). It was also supposed to address inequalities. One Darfur is not sufficient for Darfurians, it might be better to have three or more.

Environmental and security issues compound the present situation. On the one hand, the conflict has long-term environmental implications; but on the other, the short-term priority is to cease hostilities, so that services can be delivered, displaced people can be repatriated and militias can be disarmed. The AU has a key role to play in this process but lacks direction and leadership. Darfurians should also take advantage of the current opening up of their society; 11,000 people are currently employed by 80 international organisations in Darfur, and cross-tribal marriages inside the camps are common.

A political agreement must be reached which improves security so that people can return to their villages and continue their traditional way of life, as well as providing for power-sharing and development. The most important element of such an agreement will be repatriation. A good first step would be to implement the ceasefire with international monitors; this will require a more experienced AU force, with better logistics, supported by the international community. The government must stop playing a part in destabilising Darfur, and the armed movements must stop fighting. Unlike government forces, the soldiers who are fighting for the armed movements are not fed, so they often have to resort to theft (including from the international community), causing further instability. The government has at times even provided food for the rebel movements, in an attempt to reduce theft and in recognition of other parts of the country which also suffer from underdevelopment, but these gestures may simply be an indication of the extent of the media war in Darfur.

The political situation impacts not only security but also development. Although the issues at stake in Darfur concern the whole country, Darfur has been left out of national processes. Thanks to high levels of illiteracy and a lack of local intellectuals, MPs are imported from other parts of the country. In addition, the cost of mediation between combatants has drained local resources so that nothing remains for infrastructural development and Darfur therefore lags behind the rest of Sudan. Even trying to spend any funds that remain for development proves difficult in the context of political in-fighting.

The progress made by the CPA can be used positively. The government has the political will to implement the CPA, and there is also international support for national wealth to be distributed more evenly. A model should be created for Darfur based on transparency, accountability and the rule of law, such as the CPA models for Abyei, southern Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains. However, Darfur has its own character, its structures and environment. Although some elements of the CPA can be used to solve the Darfur problem, the agreement cannot be transferred automatically to Darfur. It remains unclear how the Protocols will be implemented when peace is signed, and how they will be applied at the level below the state (the native administrations), but the CPA can and should inspire the government and the rebel movements to seek a solution. Naivasha has created the right environment for a settlement in Darfur, and the interim constitution is a further step in the right direction.

A common criticism of the CPA is that it is not representative; the South Sudan Democratic Forces, for example, have not been hitherto recognised by the SPLM and are therefore excluded. On the other hand, it should be recognised that it is a peace agreement that brought an end to a war which was fought by two sides - the National Congress party and the SPLM - and it is natural that negotiation is with the government of the day. Perhaps the agreement should be perceived not just in terms of who negotiated but also what the results are. What is important now is not so much the CPA itself but the interim constitution into which it has been translated; no objective criticism of the constitution itself has yet been heard. The content of the CPA is good: accountability and transparency are now in the constitution; it is not Islamic; it is not a one-party system; it will include a free and fair election; and it includes devolved government. This tone of reconciliation was at the core of the discussions at Naivasha and Cairo.

There can be no comprehensive peace without comprehensive involvement. Security is not simply a question of an improved police force, and wealth sharing is not simply a question of percentages. A holistic approach is necessary, which recognises Sudan's identity crisis, which deals in innovative ways with the environmental impact, which does not leave decision-making in the hands of Arabists or Islamists or a post-colonial elite, and which moves away from conventional political parties where appropriate.

Neither the rebel movements nor the government represent all Darfurians. If the terms of a future peace agreement are too favourable to the movements - who speak only for about 10% of the population of Darfur - then this will spark other problems elsewhere in the country and fighting could intensify. A national, inclusive conference is needed to solve the problems of Darfur in order to end the fighting, allow for the provision of humanitarian aid and establish the rule of law. Darfurians must feel safe in their own country, and that will only come about if they feel they have some ownership of the peace process.

The Darfur problem has been blown out of proportion by the struggle for power, internally and externally, and the international community allows itself to be manipulated. Its unrealistic expectations can themselves be an obstacle to progress. Yet there is a need to open up Darfur to the press and to international NGOs, and the Government of Sudan should also cooperate with the ICC. It cannot hide behind sovereignty, which ultimately derives from the people.

In addition, those who have committed crimes will have to be identified and pursued. Peace without justice means nothing. There is no rule of law while the government and police refuse to prosecute their own people, and there is no security while the *janjaweed* are still operational. A truth and reconciliation commission could make a positive contribution, but may not be relevant in Sudan. Instead, the focus should be on assisting communities to return home and to rebuild infrastructure. Justice must go hand-in-hand with peace and reconciliation.

Establishing Sustainable Peace on the Ground

Remarks by Peter Dixon (Concordis International)

One of the biggest obstacles to establishing sustainable peace on the ground is a lack of trust, but monitoring can help to build trust. The international community's response is important and it can often have a valuable role to play. How does one deal with a lack of trust? It is not practical never to trust someone again, but nor is it possible simply to forget the past and move forward. Trust must therefore be built up progressively through a combination of confidence- and security- building measures, as has been demonstrated in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

The aim should be to move from a situation of conflict, tension and mutual mistrust to increased openness and transparency, reduced fear and increased security for both (or all) sides and gradually to improved trust. For this to happen certain preconditions are needed. For example, there must be some willingness on all sides to reduce tension, agreement on principles or a framework for negotiations, an adaptation of measures so that they are appropriate for a civil war or insurgency situation, and agreement on basic principles (not just to cease fire). There is a need for transparency and openness on both sides, which then leads to the ability to be able to predict what the other side might do next.

Potential measures include: an exchange of information about either side's military movements; inspections by the other side; communication between opposing forces; establishment of ceasefires; demilitarisation of areas or the limitation of troop numbers; agreement on humanitarian access; voluntary no-fly zones; consultation between commanders with a third party; informal visits; and joint teams and patrols. How could apply to Darfur, where there is not currently an even balance of power? The process of delineating regions (cantonment) can be used to build up trust progressively. A code of conduct also gives the people confidence in their government, as do public statements. Public meetings could be organised jointly in which rebel movements talk about their positions and reassure local people. Reintegration is vital and should be dealt with before disarmament and demobilisation; DDR should be rephrased 'RDD'.

Discussion

The root causes of the problems in Darfur are longstanding. Following the 1914 war with the UK, the Sudanese in general, and those of the ruling classes in particular, began to harbour grievances associated with lost status and increased marginalisation. When the SPLM succeeded in gaining the international community's awareness and in negotiating with the government, Darfurians sought to follow suit to restore their former glory and regain their independence. The problems in Darfur are more complicated than those in the South, owing to the greater number of stakeholders, and because unlike in southern Blue Nile

and the Nuba mountains those who have taken up weapons are not from the ruling classes. Foreign intervention further complicates the situation because the foreign elements seem to be backing only some parties.

Disarmament is another issue and can be very difficult to enforce, especially in regions as large as Darfur. DDR is dependent upon trust and the involvement of a neutral third party. In the case of Darfur this third party is the AU, but the efficiency of the AU is questionable and it may be appropriate to involve the UN, at least in a monitoring capacity. Indeed, some believe that increasing the number of troops on the ground is the only way to build trust, but regardless of this it is very difficult to build trust while a ceasefire is being violated.

Problems between pastoralists and sedentary farmers have been exacerbated by trespassing and by competition for resources, especially water. The drought that affected the Sudan in the early 1980s forced many northern tribes to move southwards. Shifting agricultural patterns and outbreaks of fire have also contributed to the problem of desertification in Darfur. It is vital to build confidence between sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists, for example through providing nomads with basic services such as water and education.

The proliferation of arms in Darfur also has created many problems. It is necessary to identify those who are carrying arms in Darfur, and how many weapons there are. It must also be clear to whom a ceasefire declaration would apply and who would be responsible for its implementation. The AU cannot implement such a ceasefire and requires the help of the international community. Since Darfurians are now so full of hatred and fear, their contribution to the process of rebuilding trust is crucial. Neither will the proliferation of weapons subside until there is an effective police force to uphold the law.

There are high levels of mistrust between the government and the armed movements. The government in particular is fearful that the rebel groups are buying time to overthrow the state, and neither side trusts the other's commitments. The difference between the peace process in the South and the situation in Darfur is that there is more than one rebel group in the latter, and that even within them there are differences of opinion and disagreements about hierarchy and representation. The peace process was more straightforward in the South where the government was only dealing with the SPLM; indeed, peace would be more likely if the rebel groups could work together.

Some people say that the *janjaweed* prevent them from going back to their villages, but another important factor is the lack of a basic infrastructure: hospitals, schools and roads. The displaced must understand that the camps are not a long-term solution, and that they will create a culture of resentment and hatred. What is needed is a reconciliation of tribes, compensation for lost property and an easing of passage for nomads, which the AU is now facilitating. Better infrastructure and communications will also enable the growth of trust.

Restoring Confidence in a Safe Return to Home Areas

Remarks by Dr Mudawi Ibrahim (Sudan Social Development Organisation)

The majority of IDPs have moved because of security issues, but a reasonable number have also moved because of the provision of services in the camps which are not available in their home area. It has been difficult to restore Darfurians' levels of confidence because the AU itself does not know how to deal with the current situation. Firstly, its mandate was not clear to its own troops, to the government or to the population of Darfur. Secondly, it has been unable to act because it is not permitted to enter the camps, even though many of the police protecting the camps are also those who are simultaneously destroying villages. Thirdly, it has seemed unwilling to act, refusing to help IDPs when they are attacked by armed forces. Fourthly, it does not enjoy the trust of international organisations or of Darfurians, whether because of the selection of countries from which forces have been seconded, or because AU forces often move in convoy with government forces, or because of its inability or unwillingness to act. Moreover, the ongoing lack of services in rural areas contributes to the IDPs' feelings of insecurity.

The people of Darfur are also mistrustful of the government's efforts at facilitating reconciliation conferences. All the parties need to be negotiating, and there are many who have been left out of the process, or who so perceive themselves. If this strategy continues then any agreement will not be acceptable because many people in Darfur have interests but are not part of the armed movements. We need therefore to find a way of bringing all the parties to the table. The government claims that reconciliation and dialogue between tribes is underway, but often those involved do not actually represent the IDPs themselves, so the reconciliation process is ineffective. The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) in particular has grown very quickly, resulting in a distorted line of command and lack of internal structure in which some acts are carried out in the SLA's name but without its consent. There is a great need for capacity building and greater coherence within both rebel movements. There also has to be genuine political will to implement any agreement. If a party is forced to sign a peace agreement the result will probably be that its provisions are not adhered to in the long term.

Discussion

It is understandable that the people of Darfur do not feel safe to return home in a climate of broken ceasefires. The AU has an unclear mandate even now, and Darfur needs a much more international force. Many soldiers are perceived to be pro-government, and even if that is not true, the perception is at least as important. Darfur is completely destroyed and needs to be rehabilitated. The conflict over land and tribal reconciliation is the key to the problem, but this can only be resolved if IDPs and refugees return home to their villages.

The people of Darfur live in reasonable conditions in the camps, yet they express a real wish to go home. Greater coordination is needed for the activities and efforts of international organisations, including a policy paper and a master plan. The numbers of those in camps has now doubled from 45,000 to 90,000, which ultimately increases the suffering of these people, but they will not return home unless basic services are offered. There are concerns about the availability of fodder for animals and the availability of wood for rebuilding and cooking. Supplying the people of Darfur with gas or kerosene may alleviate this problem and lead to an increased standard of living.

There is also a need to respond to Darfurians' emotional needs. Setting up a broadcasting service in Darfur would help to foster a better community spirit and help to rebuild the social fabric, as well as erase fear and hatred. Cheap transistor radios are affordable for most people, and through this medium radio stations will be able to communicate and train young people from the different tribes.

Some argued that there is some degree of confidence between the government and the displaced. After all, IDPs have moved to the government centres and most Darfurians have not left Sudan. The highest levels of mistrust are between the tribes themselves. The government has to date spent more than US\$ 200 million on repatriation, and national NGOs are also involved. International NGOs are stalling, citing lack of security, because it is easier to provide services in the camps, but this does not encourage people to return home. Donor fatigue will not allow this situation to continue indefinitely, and Sudan does not want to be a nation of aid recipients. More work needs to be done to rehabilitate villages and to provide employment and land for grazing and agriculture, especially since, if people are not encouraged to return home, those who are currently residing in foreign countries, such as Chad, may start to cause problems there.

Others argue that Darfurians are going to government centres not because they trust the government but because there is no police force in the villages and government-controlled areas happen to be the safest. There is a great need for a 'reformed' police force made up of local police officers, including some of the IDPs in the camps, to restore local confidence.

It is vital to respond to the profound lack of trust in Darfur at the current time, and particularly to increase levels of confidence amongst IDPs in the government and in the police. The police need to be reformed and trained in human rights and encouraged to recruit from within the camps. The system for compensation should be improved, so that it is linked to return, but return must always mean voluntary return to one's place of origin.

Restoring Social Security

Remarks by Dr Eva d'Adrian

IDPs are individuals who have fled their homes, under duress, yet remain in their own territory. National sovereignty must be respected, but with sovereignty comes the responsibility to citizens. In June 2005 over a third of the 9.1 million IDPs across Sudan wanted to return home, but certain conditions need to be met for this to happen, such as safe routes and a reasonable standard of living - the lack of which caused many to leave in the first place. Nonetheless, more than 8 million IDPs have returned home in Sudan in the last decade. This shows that people want to go home, despite the significant hardship they face by returning. It is also worth noting that two thirds of the population of Darfur have not been displaced.

The issue of ethnicity complicates the situation in Darfur. The pastoralists are responsible for unsettling many of the currently displaced. Ethnic differences determine the situation of many Darfurians but should not determine the provision of services. Indeed, the words 'ethnic group' should not be used at all; people should rather be referred to as those who are in need of services, especially those from destroyed villages. The government and local councils need instead to build the capacity of the area and to provide social services to help rebuild society.

In addition to services mentioned above, it may be necessary to provide farmers with tools and seeds as well as food rations for two agricultural seasons in order to help them re-establish reliable food production and to encourage sustainability and self-sufficiency. A complete study of the infrastructure in Darfur is needed, assessing what is left, what can be repaired and what needs replacing, with an emphasis on providing basic and cheap public transport. There is no magic formula or tool-kit for creating inter-community networks, but improved livelihoods help to reverse any breakdown of social networks. The number of IDPs and refugees who need to be returned to their homes in Darfur is reputed to be in the region of 1.25 million. The government and local authorities have limited resources to support these IDPs, yet their needs are the same as those of the main population. Disarmament is a vital first step, but the *janjaweed* also need to be provided with viable and alternative livelihoods, with training if necessary.

Discussion

Part of the problem in Darfur is that the Sudanese refuse to admit the scale or nature of the problem. If it is a tribal problem, that does not explain that the SLA includes 34 of Darfur's 150 or more tribal groups. The Declaration of Principles (DoP) signed in Abuja in July 2005 touches on a number of social issues, but the political issues are most crucial, because without a political solution peace will not follow. There is a need to focus on the positive aspects of Darfur and those

aspects that we have in common, before coming up with practical recommendations.

If the process of building trust is slow, the people of Darfur will suffer. How can this process be accelerated? The Government of Sudan must be transparent and honest; those carrying arms must unite under one vision; and borders must be controlled to ensure that foreign intervention does not complicate the process. Darfur's problem affects all the people of Darfur, regardless of ethnic background or occupation.

It is only the international community, especially the UN, which differentiates between IDPs and refugees, because the UN does not explicitly look after IDPs. Indeed, in addition to those IDPs who are in camps, there are many who are lodging with relatives in other villages. There are also displaced nomads, who migrated to urban areas because there was no support for a rural lifestyle. It is also necessary to provide support for these relatives as well as maintaining social order and links in the camps.

IDPs may live under different circumstances but security is the main issue for all of them. As well as compensation, the people of Darfur need strong leadership to instil a sense of justice, trust and security and to enable the displaced to return home. The longer the displaced are kept in camps then the more likely it is that they will establish new values and habits and become dependent on aid.

Although the fragility of social networks has been discussed above, and there is disagreement about the strength of Darfur's social fabric, family ties still play a key role in Darfur and in Sudan. These are reliable and dependable, as are tribal links, even though some of these have developed a political manifestation. Sudan is richest in its people, and there is a need to invest in restoring the existing social capital rather than trying to create new capital. There are also strong religious ties, which can be built upon to strengthen the peace process. Problems arise when those from abroad (whether individuals or international organisations) come and impose their views and opinions. At the same time the camps are beginning to provide an alternative haven for forming new relationships and rebuilding the social fabric, especially outside the urban areas.

Nonetheless, some felt that the Sudanese should be more appreciative of the international community's involvement in Darfur. For even if eighty percent of the funds it receives are spent on administration, at least twenty percent is being spent on the people of Darfur.

Restoring Environmental Security

Remarks by Brendan Bromwich (Tearfund) and Dr Daniel Brockington (University of Manchester)

This presentation draws on initial research to track both environmental and non-environmental vulnerabilities through the various stages of the conflict. What is the link, if any, between conflict and the environment?

The sustainable use of water is a key issue. Generally, the rock in Darfur is very hard, impermeable and not conducive to the storage of water. A productive well in Darfur produces 1.5 litres/second, compared to a productive well in Oman which will produce between 5 and 30 litres/second. There has also been a general downward trend in rainfall in Darfur over the past 60 years. To counteract diminishing resources, there needs to be technological or institutional intervention, for example, through negotiation between *damra* and village to have access to the *wadi* or a way through the *junein*.

Water is not, however, in short supply in all areas of Darfur. Indeed, many believe that the biggest aquifer in Sudan, and maybe in Africa, lies under Darfur. Re-establishing water resources is the next priority after establishing security, and more work needs to be done to prevent environmental degradation. In particular, more creativity is required. The solution is not to drill more wells, because the supply of underground water is limited and wells can be difficult or dangerous for settled and nomadic communities to reach. Groundwater recharge steps should be taken, such as damming *wadis* during the rainy season and building terraces, alongside new techniques such as rainwater harvesting. Other possible approaches include water-saving methods and prioritising the use of water for people, animals and crops.

Short-term solutions must be balanced with long-term effects, and although installing hand pumps generates more water for villages in the short term it does not provide a long-term sustainable development strategy. Too many hand pumps in the wrong area drain the water table. They may also jeopardise the return of IDPs, especially those who left their villages due to water shortages. Providing water to villages could encourage nomads to remain in burnt-down villages, rather than encouraging farmers to return. Hand pumps must therefore be available along nomadic routes in addition to those provided in villages.

Artesian wells are another alternative. These cost in the region of US\$ 10,000 but are more effective than hand pumps because they serve a greater number of people. However, artesian wells should only be installed where there are big water reserves and where the water table is 50 metres beneath the surface. Whichever water supply is selected, it has to be right for the specific area - there can be no general policy.

New technology and techniques, such as remote sensing, have been employed in western Darfur to locate water sources. Indeed, UNICEF is using the same technique in undertaking a comprehensive twelve-month study of water in the whole of Darfur. When the study is complete, we will be in a much better position to determine if the water problems in Darfur are due to difficulties of availability or distribution. With greater technological advances, more areas can produce water as wells are dug deeper, but there could be long-term damage to the environment if resources are over exploited.

Discussion

When people move back to their villages, there will be a huge demand for wood (as building material and fuel), resulting in further deforestation, which in turn leads to erosion, which decreases the productivity of the soil and results in long-term problems such as a decline in agricultural land.

The average height of a tree in Darfur is 3 metres. Soil fertility has also deteriorated over time. Cultivation itself, especially intensive farming, can be very damaging to soil if the soil is not left to lie fallow and recover. The planting of more trees would bind the soil together, reducing the threat of desertification and replenishing wood stocks. One option would be to supply Y-shaped posts instead of trees to returning IDPs and refugees. Another would be to import wood from other parts of the country, such as southern Sudan, which would have an economic as well as an environmental benefit. Trees could also be saved by growing grasses which tolerate aridity, such as those which grow in Kordofan. But in the long term new technologies must be adopted, perhaps using different building materials, such as stone, grass or manufactured house frames, and different sources of energy, like solar power.

Environmental protection also requires good governance. Local government and committees must understand the importance of protecting biodiversity, and take steps to protect it. Economic diversification should be encouraged simultaneously, through local and foreign investment, to help ease the pressure on land. Small dairy product factories, for example, could help local people to generate incomes in their villages. Sensible environmental governance used to be monitored by *sheikhs*; this system should be reinstated.

Addressing the environmental needs of nomads - who often feel neglected by the international community which incorrectly groups them with the *janjaweed* - is particularly important. Challenges such as under- and over-grazing, both of which increase animal mortality, and lack of animal husbandry should all be addressed. There are currently only five vets in the whole of northern Darfur.

It must not be forgotten that donkeys are vital to the people of Darfur. Without donkeys local people cannot access water, markets or farms, or collect wood or fodder. Donkeys are a fundamental necessity and should be prioritised.

The Reconstruction of Darfur

Remarks by Dr Majzoub Mohamed (Practical Action)

There are many existing peace initiatives between the tribes which can be built upon. The focus now must be on rehabilitation and development efforts in order to meet those priorities already set. In addition to those areas already considered, these could include: a concentration on rapid, high impact projects such as dams and terraces; capacity building; sharing indigenous knowledge; working in partnership to ensure increased impact; and developing community-based organisations which enhance grass-roots democracy. Human development is the most important element in community development, and community development is the foundation for delivering and adapting development interventions. There are no proper exit strategies without efficient and effective community structures.

It is important to facilitate the sharing of indigenous knowledge, such as educating people about the benefits of terracing. Sharing knowledge is as important as developing local infrastructure. Education and health are two key areas which should be promoted to encourage the displaced to return. Reconstructing schools should be a priority, as should persuading teachers - perhaps through the provision of incentives - to leave the towns and return to the rural schools.

Although two thirds of the population in Darfur have not, some two million have been displaced. The presence of so many IDPs in camps can be used as an opportunity for training and engaging in Sudanese networks. For example, selected men and women could be trained to become agricultural extension agents, para-vets or midwives. The displaced themselves know best what their needs and priorities are, not the international community. The international community should therefore approach development sensitively, and should favour small-scale, well-thought-out projects over larger projects that may not best serve the needs of local people. Chances of success could be increased by the existence of an effective development committee, as well as an integrated approach.

Discussion

International NGOs should not only provide food assistance but should also carry out training and development programmes. IDPs have to know their rights, both as IDPs and as citizens. International NGOs must work together in a co-ordinated fashion and not duplicate each other's activities.

Healthcare is especially important to women, and because of Darfur's size and the ongoing conflict very little healthcare is available. Many women die during childbirth thanks to dangerous traditional techniques such as rope delivery, and a

midwife training school would be a valuable asset to address these issues. Midwives are currently paid by the numbers of babies they deliver so there is a disincentive to refer possible problem cases to the hospital. There are very few community health workers, only a handful of doctors, and very limited equipment. Some medical service companies in Khartoum donate old equipment, and many hospitals in the UK would donate equipment if there were not the problems associated with transport. Improvements could be made in Darfur through mobile health clinics in addition to the permanent centres which have already been suggested.

More consideration should also be given to cross-breeding to produce animals and crops that are hardy and can survive the difficult and varied conditions in Darfur. For example, certain varieties of sorghum grow well in southern Darfur, but others are more appropriate for northern Darfur. Small-scale schemes, such as sugar production, could also be valuable, although there is a requirement to assess an area before implementing any scheme as, for instance, tractors are not well suited to Darfur's terrain. Other alternative forms of produce include tomatoes, which can be grown on the terraces up to six months after the rainy season.

Transport links must be improved so that products can be traded, and proper labelling will be required to support an export trade. Training in road building would increase transferable skills such as how to build houses from stone, which would reduce the demand for wood and meet the demand for affordable housing. There should be less reliance on oil and more on intermediate technology. Other alternatives to fuel must also be considered, not simply gas and kerosene, which are more difficult to find in rural areas and can be expensive. For example, 40% less wood could be used by gathering the sand around the wood in an appropriate way, and wood consumption could be reduced by using more fuel-efficient stoves.

These approaches must also be supported by a modern financial system that combines the current Islamic system with the traditional banking system. Sudan's financial resources and funds given by the international community must also be deployed more responsibly and with more transparency.

There is also the continuing conundrum of finding a solution which enables nomads to continue their way of life without encroaching on sedentary farmers, as the old system of mutual dependence is no longer feasible. Possibilities include finding a new homeland for them or culling some of the animals since the capacity of the land to support them has been exceeded. Yet a number of donors are unwilling to work with nomads, despite their helpfulness in inter-tribal conflict resolution. More needs to be made of local knowledge through consultation with the local people and through involving displaced communities in plans for their return.

Inter-Agency Co-operation and Security Sector Reform

Remarks by Maj Gen at-Tayib Abdelrahman Mukhtar (former Chief of Police in Darfur)

The problems in Darfur are not recent. There has been a gradual breakdown in law and order, and increase in gun crime, since the time of Nimieri's regime. The situation is further complicated by the involvement of Chad and Libya. Before the conflict in Darfur occurred, all of the tribes lived in peace and there was little or no crime. The war in Chad increased the supply of arms in Darfur, and Gaddafi also armed groups in Sudan to support the Chadian opposition. On the ground, 8,000 policemen have been sent to Darfur to assist with policing, and although they are not from Darfur and do not command the same respect, the system of a *wali* and police chief in every state should remain. Furthermore, the rainy season brings problems for the movement of the police, especially in South Darfur.

An agreement for Darfur must be comprehensive and visionary, and incorporated into a federal system based on democracy, transparency and accountability. This system will have to empower native administrations without undermining existing government structures, while developing economically. The establishment of a commission responsible for development in Darfur would be a good start. There are many humanitarian and social issues that must be addressed.

The security sector should not be neglected. If established and implemented, security sector reform helps to establish confidence and trust. A code of conduct was drafted by the AU in 2002 for the armed forces in Sudan, containing rules such as to disobey unlawful orders. This is a helpful document, but the government forces in Sudan and especially in Darfur must prove to its citizens that the rules as laid down by this code are being operationalised. This would go a long way to help restore levels of trust in the government. In particular, the two sections of the constitution referring to armed and police forces, especially articles such as 144:2 and 148:1, should be implemented on the ground.

Discussion

A well-trained police force, which enjoys the confidence of IDPs, will need to be the cornerstone of effective repatriation. The police service is chronically understaffed and currently has a poor reputation. Reform is vital, and it is particularly important to ensure that it is a more inclusive, respectful and effective body which serves the local people and regains their trust.

One possible approach is tribal policing such as in Afghanistan, where the local police derives from a broad cross-section of tribes and is therefore regarded as a neutral body. If adopted, such an approach would help to avoid the creation of a police force which is tribalist, partisan and unrepresentative of Sudanese

diversity. The police's capacity also needs to be enhanced so that police officers can prevent rebel groups from stealing livestock. The police should, as anywhere else, be supportive of the government, but non-partisan.

Training, too, is of paramount importance and needs to be an ongoing process. On the one hand, members of the police force must be taught to think more carefully about countering the culture of violence, wielding power responsibly, empowering and working with the native administration, and improving its own internal culture. They must also be trained to effectively maintain order and preserve human rights. A police monitoring committee in every county could help to keep the Darfurian police force accountable. On the other hand, policemen must also be trained to fight in order to keep peace. A policeman has to display a strong face and appearance in order to be respected for the job he is doing.

To date, some progress on police reform has been made. Police training and education in human rights, for example, has taken place in the IDP camps. There have also been confidence building exercises such as football matches arranged between the IDPs and the police. Furthermore, the fact that crimes against humanity could be prosecuted in future years is becoming understood and tempering the behaviour of the police force.

Sudan's national law must also state more clearly the rights and responsibilities of both the police and of citizens. The people of Sudan should know their responsibilities and those in positions of authority should not take advantage of the law. Civilians must also be told their rights when they are arrested.

It is very important for a united country to have a national army, police force and civil service to serve all its people. The recruitment and training are and should be national in their orientation - in other words, one of the main criteria for recruitment should be Sudanese citizenship. Specific training for the forces in Darfur would also be very useful. There may be space for a security coordinating committee, accessible to the people, which keeps the armed forces accountable and shares information with the general public.

The laws governing the National Armed Forces are well-written, but the key problem lies with their implementation. Their remains an assumption that the SAF amounts to the entire armed forces of the North and that the SPLA amounts to the same in the South; these views ignore the partisan nature of the Northern and Southern armies. In the North there remain armed groups which are not part of the SAF, and in the South the SSSF remains an independent armed group.

Full repatriation cannot occur before the establishment of security, which itself requires the disarmament of the militias, including the *janjaweed*. Any rebel group which is left out of a peace agreement on Darfur will perceive itself as a loser and will be treated by the government as a scapegoat. As a consequence, the group concerned is likely to fight more fiercely and will split from the rebel alliance.

ABOUT CONCORDIS INTERNATIONAL

Concordis International is a British non-profit organisation that seeks to achieve long-term transformation of relationships across conflict boundaries, by engaging all constituencies of a country or region in sustained examination of issues of common interest. These systematic and well-researched discussions move beyond the lines of confrontation to build on shared purpose and explore new possibilities for peace. Rather than becoming involved in official peace negotiations, we aim to build relationships of trust that pave the way for peace or contribute to post-conflict nation-building. The work is underpinned by values – such as justice and equity – that are shared by those of many faiths and traditions.

Concordis International's primary methodology involves a series of informal, low-profile consultations, held in a neutral venue and attended by key individuals linked to their respective leaders and constituencies. As they attend the consultations in a personal capacity, participants are not under pressure to maintain a particular party line. The consultations take place away from the public and media eye, and are carefully constructed on a solid foundation of in-depth research into the structural causes of conflict and consideration of the economic and social factors necessary to sustainable peace. Our wide network of academic contacts ensures that the preparatory research is of high quality.

Under the name Newick Park Initiative (NPI), the Concordis International team was instrumental in South Africa in establishing confidential dialogue between leading members of the ANC and the white establishment, contributing to the peaceful ending of apartheid. In the aftermath of Rwanda's 1994 genocide, NPI played a critical role in resolving issues of agriculture and justice, successfully bringing together senior Tutsis and Hutus to consider Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and traditional *gacaca* courts. In 1999, at the invitation of senior Sudanese, the Concordis team and the African Renaissance Institute launched the Sudan Peace-Building Programme and together ran six consultations. Subsequently, Concordis International has responded to requests from senior Sudanese to remain engaged, through facilitating informal dialogue aimed at developing consensus on post-conflict priorities for Sudan and contributing to the resolution of regional issues like Darfur and Eastern Sudan.

In addition to informal consultations, Concordis adopts other means of furthering peace processes – such as publications and capacity-building workshops – though always adopting a non-partisan approach. Peace-building work in countries other than Sudan – including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel/Palestine and Afghanistan – is currently in a development stage. The work of Concordis International is funded through contributions from private individuals, community groups, NGOs, grant-giving trusts and foundations, and government agencies.

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